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What Can We Learn from Foreign Systems?
Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan
Mark J. Loewenstein"
This Essay considers the stakeholder debate in the context of the German and Japanese
legal systems. Although, nominally, corporations in those counies must operate in the interests
ofshareholder, in fact nonshareholder constituencies have considerable influence on corporate
decision makers. Of equal importance, weak securities markets and ineffective or nonexistent
legal protections for shareholders are also important factors in strengthening the position of
nonshareholder constituencies and feeing directors to consider their interests. Thus, the
stakeholder debate is more ofan issue in the United States andBzitain, where more shareholder-
centic models floutish.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As one tours the corporate globe, it appears that explicitly
recognizing stakeholder concerns is largely an Anglo-American
problem. The stakeholder movement, which began in the 1980s in the
United States, was initiated by corporate directors seeking legislative
protection for considering the interests of stakeholders other than
shareholders when deciding how to respond to a hostile takeover offer.'
The movement has been successful; about thirty jurisdictions have
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, University of Colorado
School of Law. I would like to thank Michael Belochi (Class of 2003) for his excellent
assistance in the research and preparation of this Essay.
1. There is extensive literature on this topic. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
CoRpoRAn GOVERNANCE § 8.03, at 397 (1993 & Supp. 2001); Committee on Corporate
Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990)
(criticizing the statutes); Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Consttuency Statutes: A Dialectical
Interpretation, 15 J. L. & COi. 257, 294 (1995) ("Stakeholder/corporate constituency
analysis asks the right question of what duties corporations owe to non-shareholder
constituents. As creatures obtaining social benefits in the form of limited liability and other
corporate features, corporations have duties to members of society.'); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70
TEx. L. REv. 579 (1992) (arguing in favor of such statutes because the costs to other
stakeholders often outveigh the gains to shareholders).
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adopted some form of stakeholder legislation, although Delaware has
not.2 There are at least three factors that explain why the stakeholder
movement has not been a concern in most of the world: first, most
industrialized economies outside of the United States and Great Britain
are characterized by corporations lacking the emphasis on shareholder
supremacy that is becoming the hallmark of the Anglo-American
corporation;3 second, in most other economies, the hostile takeover is
virtually unknown; and third, outside of the United States, the
shareholder derivative action is rare. Combined, these factors mean
that, for the most part, directors of non-U.S. companies are simply less
accountable to the interests of shareholders than are the directors of a
U.S. company.' In a non-U.S. environment, the director may be more
concerned with the effect of a decision on employees or the local
economy than would a U.S. director. As a result, the issue of whether
directors should be empowered, when exercising their decision-making
authority, to take into account the interests of corporate stakeholders
other than shareholders has not been much of an issue outside of the
United States and Great Britain.! This Essay examines the corporate
governance mechanisms in Germany and Japan, two of the major
economic competitors of the United States, to explore the extent to
which their systems accommodate the concerns of other stakeholders.
2. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATONS 41-42
(5th ed. 2000).
3. The stakeholder debate has touched the British Isles. For example, Senior
Lecturer Ben Pettet of the University College London explains:
In England the corporate social responsibility question, although largely in the
form of the related industrial democracy debate, had acquired a high public profile
by the late 1970s, when the majority report of the Bullock Committee
recommended having worker representation on company boards. In 1980
Parliament enacted that boards of directors must have regard to the interests of
their employees as well as their members .... [although] it would be virtually
impossible for employees to get any legal remedies.
Ben Pettet, The Sftring of Corporate Social Conscience: From 'Cakes and Ale' to
CommunityProgrammes, 50 CuRRENT LEGALPROB. 279,304-05 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
4. Some scholars have expressed doubt on the extent to which U.S. law does indeed
protect minority shareholders. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect
of "Global" Convergence in Corpomte Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 330 (2001)
("The reputation of the United States legal system for protection of minority investors in
corporations is no longer grounded in reality.").
5. But see id at 333 n.63 (pointing out that stakeholder concerns have been
addressed in Korea and Indonesia).
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I. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
From an American perspective, the German model of corporate
governance has two striking characteristics. First, as a matter of
positive law, the system provides strong protection for employees of
the company, giving them a direct role in corporate governance.'
Second, as a result of various economic and social factors, large
German banks have become the largest shareholders and most active
board members in the large corporations.7 To the extent that
stakeholder questions are questions about employee interests, the
German system would seem to provide an example of progressive
stakeholder legislation. However, large corporations have stakeholders
other than their employees and shareholders, and it is fair to inquire
whether the German model is responsive to the interests of those other
stakeholders. For instance, if a German company is considering a
restructuring that would have an effect on the community in which its
principle operations are located, to what extent would those
community interests get a fair hearing before the corporate decision
makers? While the answer to this question might depend on the
identity and predilections of the decision makers, likely answers may
also come from important factors in the system, such as the structure
of corporate governance itself, and the role of employees, labor unions,
and banks. I will return to this question after a summary of the
German system.
The origins of German stakeholder governance can be traced
back to approximately 1870, before which German companies were
subject to oversight and control by the government Governmental
control, of course, reflects the influence of socialism at that time. The
Reform Act of 1870 replaced the direct state oversight with a system
that required an outside board, called the AufsichtsM4 which was to be
the intermediary between the management team, called the Vorstanc
and all outside interests.' It was meant to reflect the interests of all
stakeholders including the investors, workers, the state, and others.
6. But see Tanscrpt-Corporate SocialResponsibiliy: Paradgm or Paradox9 84
CORNELL L. REv 1282, 1290-91 (1999) (reproducing remarks of Lawrence Cunningham,
which suggest that the German and U.S. models, in practice, do not differ greatly).
7. See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When
Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 328 (1996).
S. See Klaus J. Hopt, The German Two-TierBoard (Aufsichtbmt): A German iew
on Corporate Governance, in COMPARAnVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3, 6 (Klaus J. Hopt &
Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997).
9. See id.
2002] 1675
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Thus, the split two-tier system of a supervisory Amfsichtsrat board and
a management Vorstandboard was born.'"
As first created, the two-tier system fell short of expectations.
The supervisory board was to be responsive to nonshareholder outside
interests, as well as those of shareholder owners, but failed to
accomplish these ends." Instead, owners took the withdrawal of direct
state oversight as license to abandon the interests of other stakeholders
and focus on profits. In response, starting in 1884, the government
initiated corporate governance reforms improving the protection of
nonowner stakeholders." These reforms reached an extreme point, as
did many things, during the period of Nazi rule in Germany. Hitler's
government enacted a new business corporation statute in 1937,
requiring the "managing board ... to manage the corporation as the
good of the enterprise and its retinue and the common weal of folk and
realm demand."3 The Nazis sought to invoke a legal system that
would allow the state to discipline businesses that did not direct their
efforts in support of Nazi policies. This twist in the evolution of
Germany's codetermination history threatened the viability of the
concept in the postwar period, as critics perceived "non-shareholder
constituency statutes-which potentially include the communitarian
goals of codetermination-as the first step down the road to statism,
collectivism, and the destruction of individual entrepreneurialism " '
Postwar reforms, however, did not abandon the concept and
culminated in the Codetermination Act of 1976, which requires
mandatory and significant employee representation on the supervisory
A ufsich tsrat b oar d. "
It is interesting to note that the history of these reforms has
shown consistency in two ways. First, German legislators have upheld
the two-tier system, despite a considerable debate over its efficiency as
a governance system and its effectiveness as a social policy. Second,
and more importantly, German socio-political forces have adhered to
the policy that economic efficiency is worth sacrificing to "protect"
10. See id at 3-4.
11. See id
12. See idat 6.
13. See Mark G. Robilotti, Recent Developments, Codeterminaion, Stakeholder
Rights, andHostile Takeovers: A Reevaluation oftheEvidencefromAbroad, 38 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 536, 550 n.87 (1997).
14. See id.
15. Codetermination is a feature of the corporate laws of Austria, Luxembourg, and
The Netherlands, in addition to Germany. In France, Ireland, and Portugal, the law includes
aspects of codetermination. See Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corpomte Law in
the European Union, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 377, 390 (1998).
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nonshareholder constituents of the corporation. Although there has
been a pronounced focus on ''shareholder value" in Germany in recent
years, the Wall Street Journal Europe reported in a July 2001 article
that, "[w]hile preaching the virtues of shareholder value, many
Germans-both left and fight-remain loyal to their 'stakeholder'
system that spreads interests among managers, community,
government, employees and shareholders ' 7
The Codetermination Act of 1976, together with subsequent
reforms, require all stock corporations, Actiengesellschaft (AG), and
all other business entities over a certain employee base, to have a two-
tiered board structure that includes significant employee representation
on the supervisory Aufsichtsrat board.'8 For these entities, the
supervisory Aufsichtsrat board oversees the management Vorstand
board much as a board of directors oversees corporate officers in the
United States. 9  For entities that have between 500 and 2000
employees, one-third of the supervisory Aufsichtsrat board must
consist of employee representatives.' ° For entities with 2000 or more
employees, one-half of the supervisory Aufsichtsmt board must be
employee representatives, and some of these must be representatives of
the unions.' Typically, if the company has more than 20,000 workers,
the Aufsichtsrat board consists of twenty members, of which ten
represent the shareholders, seven the workers, and three the unions.2
In all cases, the shareholders elect the nonworker/nonunion
Aufsichtsrat board members.' For the larger entities, the shareholders
elect the board chair, who holds two votes and can thus break ties if the
workers and shareholders deadlock. '4 Consequently, the shareholder
16. SeeThomas J. Andre, Jr., CulturalHegemony: The Exportation ofAnglo-Saxon
Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TuL. L. REv. 69, 109-10 (1998)
(.'Shareholder value' has in fact become a slogan for a number of leading German
companies like Daimler-Benz, Veba, and Hoechst, and the notion is even widely discussed in
the German popular press. Indeed, the use of the term has become so fashionable that it is
now a virtual cliche." (footnotes omitted)).
17. See generally Ellen Thalman, Shareholder Value Loses Favor, WALL ST. J.
EUROPE, July 31,2001, at 13, available at2001 WL-WSJE 21834331.
18. This two-tiered system is mandatory for anysignificantly large German business
entity regardless of whether it is a stock corporation Actiengeselschafl (AG), a limited
liability company Gesellschaft mit beschrinkter Haflug (GmbH), a partnership limited by
shares (KgaA), a limited liability partnership (GmbH & Co.), or otherwise.




23. Id. at 5.
24. SeeRobilotti, supm note 13, at 548.
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contingent holds a voting majority as long as it votes as an undivided
block. The supervisory board meets periodically, receives audit and
other information, sets goals and direction for the entity, and evaluates
the performance of, and hires and fires the members of, the
management board. To protect the independence of the Aufsichtsrat
board, the law prohibits management Vorstand board members from
sitting on the supervisory AufsichtsratboardY
Only German stock corporations, AGs, are eligible to be traded
publicly on the stock exchange. However, a large number of other
entities also fall under the Codetermination Act of 1976. As of
October 1996, 740 enterprises were covered, including 406 AGs, 329
limited liability companies Gesellschafl mit beschr&&ker Haflung
(GmbHs), and five other noncorporate entities. 6  Extending
codetermination to nonstock companies demonstrates a commitment
to stakeholder values, at least as far as the labor force is concerned.
For present purposes, however, of greater concern is the treatment of
nonshareholder stakeholders by the publicly held AGs. In this regard,
the pattern of ownership of these corporations is important.
In Germany, individual stock ownership is very low, especially in
comparison to the United States." Although this is changing-
between 1997 and 2001 the number of individuals owning stock in
Germany more than doubled to over twelve million28-large banks and
other institutions account for the vast majority of stock ownership.
Individual Germans tend to store wealth in bank accounts, interest
25. SeeAndr&, supra note 16, at 86.
26. See Hopt, supra note 8, at n.77 (citing WSI-Mitteilungen 468 (1990); G6Tz
HuECK, GEsELLSCHAFISRECHT § 24.II.2(a), at 226-27 (19th ed. 1991); Werner Tegtmeier,
Sachgerechte Dynamil4 MrTBESTIMMUNG, Oct. 1996, at 28, 28-31, for the more recent
figures). Including nonstock enterprises under codetermination is paramount because stock
corporations are relatively few in number and not widely held. Between 1950 and 1990, the
total number of AGs fluctuated between 2000 and 3000. By comparison, there were over
500,000 GmbHs in 1992. See Rolf Birk, Germany, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 53, 54 (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo Visentini
eds., 1998).
27. Professor Andr6 noted, 'At least until the partial privatization of Deutsche
Telekom AG in late 1996, less than six percent of German households owned stock (and only
about five percent of private financial assets were held in equities)." SeeAndr&, supra note
16, at 98 (footnotes omitted).
28. See Jack Ewing, Commentary: German Investors Show Pluck-Germany Inc.
Doesn't at http://vw.businessweek.com/magazine/content/O l_36/b3747147.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2002) (noting that according to the German Share Institute, there has been a
tremendous rise in individual ownership, and despite the recent bear market, individual
German investors have held steady; by contrast, institutional and other large German
investors have reduced their holdings).
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bearing notes, real estate, and other conservative investments." Banks
are often the repository of this wealth and, in turn, own large blocks of
stock.3" While German banks have been liquidating many of their
holdings in recent years, the number of large blocks (five percent to
fifteen percent) is increasing.' Low individual ownership together
with presence of powerful unions explains why labor has such a
prominent role in corporate governance.
Arguably, bank ownership in German AGs supplies a
counterweight to the power of unions; however, this might not always
be the case, at least when the bank is also a lender to the company
(which is frequently the case). In such circumstances, the bank
director might elect a conservative course of action, preferring the
bank's interests as a lender to its interests as an equity holder. On this
view, the corporation might forego a potentially profitable, but risky,
endeavor. Labor, too, may prefer such a course of action. These and
other possible voting distortions have given rise to the observation that
some German scholars cast doubt on the desirability of this feature
[bank participation] of German corporate governance. In particular,
they argue that banks' influence among others (such as cross holdings
among corporations) is one of the main reasons for inflexibility in
German corporate governance. At the same time, the critics yearn for
more active and interested, yet dispersed shareholders.32
There is no definitive study as to how these interests play out, but
surely employee and banking representations provide a significant
source of influence that is often different than that of traditional
shareholders. The idea that self-interested directors, which might
accurately describe directors who are also bank officers and rank-and-
29. SeeAndr, supra note 16, at 97-98.
30. Banking power in Germany is concentrated in a few banking giants, in particular,
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank. These banks, in turn, are prominent
players on the nation's supervisory Aufsichtsratboards,
controlling over 10% of the seats on the supervisory councils of Germany's 100
largest companies. Furthermore, German banks are much larger than their
American counterparts; the largest three American banks have assets equal to 7%
of American GNP, while the largest three German banks control assets valued at
36% of Germany's GNP, making the German banks five times "stronger" than the
United States ones.
Robilotti, supm note 13, at 548-49 (footnotes omitted).
31. See David Charny, The German Corporate Governance System, 1998 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 145, 152-53.
32. See Bemd Singhof & Oliver Seiler, Shareholder Partic4pation in Corporate




file workers in the company, would be favorably inclined to further the
agenda of other constituents is certainly not intuitive.
The main effects of codetermination can be broadly categorized
in three areas: management-labor relations, management-shareholder
relations, and relations between management and the market for
corporate control. With regard to the first of these, having heavy
employee representation on the supervisory Aufsichtsrat board forces
direct negotiation and resolution of employee-based objectives.3
Traditionally, these objectives centered on conditions of employment
and pay, but they could also reach broader issues, such as community
support and environmental concerns. But do workers have a stronger
inclination to consider the community or the environment than
shareholders or management generally? To the extent that workers live
in a community, they would, most likely, be concerned with corporate
policies that adversely affect the community. The community would
benefit from workers' resistance to layoffs, exportation ofjobs to other
countries with lower labor costs, and restructurings that result in a loss
of jobs.' But would the worker-director support policies that benefit
the community at the expense of labor, such as higher charitable
contributions to local community organizations in lieu of higher
wages? Similarly, would the worker-director support environmental
policies that result in layoffs, in which the net benefit to the
community lies with the environmental initiatives?
A second area regarding the effects of codetermination relate
directly to corporate management, which can be considered a separate
stakeholder in the organization. Executive compensation is an
important tension point in the relationship between management and
shareholders, as the interests of each are, at least to some extent, in
conflict. The separation of management from control, which is
arguably more pronounced in the United States, explains, in part, why
executive compensation is more generous in the United States than in
Germany." Of equal importance, however, is the participation of
employee representatives on the supervisory Aufsichtsrat board."6 If
half the directors are employee representatives, a discussion of CEO
remuneration is likely to have a much different tone, and result, than
33. See Susan J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More Than Your Executive:
Rationalizing Executive Payin a Global Economy, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. RE. 63, 85-86 (2001).
34. SeeRobilotti, supranote 13, at 547-48; seealsoCharny, supranote 31, at 158-59.
35. SeegenerallyMark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum ofExecutive Compeasation,
35 WAKE FOREST L. Ry. 1 (2000).
36. SeeRobilotti, supm note 13, at 548.
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when the relevant decision makers are themselves well-compensated
CEOs at comparably sized companies." To the extent that the
stakeholder debate centers on management self-aggrandizement at the
expense of other constituencies, particularly shareholders, the German
model is, again, a progressive one.
A third important effect of codetermination is its effect on the
market for corporate control; codetermination may have a chilling
effect on hostile takeovers." German companies have experienced
relatively few hostile takeovers as compared to the United States and
Britain," and labor representation on the board may be a factor. Where
a potential takeover has an adverse effect on labor, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the acquirer is deterred from engaging in
a battle, as its adversary has such a strong self-interest in the outcome.
While management in the United States might be similarly situated to
labor in Germany, both in terms of adverse interest and ability to
influence the outcome, it may be that the price to mollify U.S.
management is less than that to mollify German labor. Moreover, with
strong, direct support from labor, German management, which has its
own interests to protect, is in a relatively better position than their U.S.
counterparts to resist shareholder pressure to accept a hostile offer.
It is important, however, not to make too much of this
speculation, inasmuch as derivative and class action shareholder suits
37. Professor Susan J. Stabile explains:
It is generally believed that union representation on the board of directors tends to
result in more egalitarian compensation practices than in other countries ....
... American executives are paid much more lavishly than their foreign
counterparts and they are paid so on the backs of workers.
Stabile, supra note 33, at 85-86 (footnote and quotations omitted); see also Loewenstein,
supra note 35, at 4.
38. See Robilotti, supra note 13, at 552-53.
39. Professor Andr6 explains:
[T]he evidence bears out the fact that hostile acquisitions in Germany are in fact
quite rare. For example, [at least until 1997] there has never been a successful
takeover by means of a hostile public tender offer in Germany, and there has never
been a takeover of a company whose shares make up part of the DAX "blue chip"
index.
Quite aside from whether German companies in general make attractive
takeover candidates, there are any number of possible explanations for the lack of
hostile takeover activity in Germany. The most obvious explanation is surely the
relatively small number of publicly traded companies and hence potential takeover
candidates.
Andr6, supra note 16, at 119 (footnotes omitted).
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are unknown in Germany." Thus, an available tool for U.S.
shareholders to hold corporate management accountable for
management's response to a hostile takeover is unavailable in
Germany. Many of these factors came into play in the case of the first
and only successful hostile takeover of a German company by a
foreign company. In November 1999, the United Kingdom's
Vodaphone launched a bid at about 200 euros per share for Germany's
Mannesmann, with the goal of creating the world's largest
telecommunications company.' Vodaphone succeeded three months
later, paying over 372 euros per share. Though one can reason that
the Aufsichtsrat simply did its job in holding out for a higher price,
another view is that codetermination and other uniquely German
factors increased the price of the takeover significantly. In any case,
the rarity of hostile takeovers is an important factor in the stakeholder
debate, because it is in that context that stakeholder concerns often
emerge. With labor's direct involvement on the Aufsichtsmt board, its
interests seem to be protected and, with it, the interests of other
stakeholders as well.
On balance, codetermination appears to be a model of corporate
governance that protects stakeholders. 3 Clearly, the interests of labor
are well represented and, from all available information, well
protected. The employees' natural ties to the communities in which
they reside suggest that labor might often serve as a proxy for the
community's interests in corporate decision making. Similarly, the
40. See Susan Jacqueline Butler, Models ofModer Corporations A Comparative
Analysis of German and US. Corporate Structure, 17 ARZ. J. INT'L & COMR L. 555, 601
(2000); see also Singhof & Seiler, supra note 32, at 556-59 (noting that the considerable
obstacles to derivative litigation in Germany precluded effective enforcement of fiduciary
duty of management through such litigation).
41. Vodaphone Mounts £79bn Hostile Bid, BBC NEWS, Nov. 21, 1999, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/the-company ile/newsid-527000/527730.stm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
42. Sources: Vodaphone, Mannesmann Merger Set USA TODAY TECH INVESTOR,
Feb. 3, 2000, at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/invest/in342.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2002).
43. German scholars Bemd Singhof and Oliver Seiler note that while the German law
seems to articulate a goal of shareholder wealth maximization,
there is a long-standing debate in Germany about the strong emphasis on
protecting shareholder interest. Some scholars maintain that corporate officers
owe fiduciary duties not only to shareholders, but also to other constituents, such
as employees. Creation and maintenance of "shareholder value" as the first and
foremost goal of management is still a source of discussion and is not easily
explained.
Singhof& Seiler, supra note 32, at 551 (footnotes omitted).
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presence of bank involvement on the supervisory board assures that
the interests of another corporate stakeholder, the creditors of the
corporation, are represented. Moreover, the paucity of hostile
takeovers combined with the lack of litigation to hold management
accountable to shareholder interests, suggests that corporate
management has more freedom of action and can, if it is so inclined,
take into account nonshareholder interests. This freedom of action is
clearly more limited in the United States. The costs associated with
this system of governance, however, are many. This may partially
explain why the German securities market is weak.' United States
companies may be more able to adjust to market downturns and seize
market opportunities if they are freed from the constraints imposed by
an entrenched labor pool and conservative bank directors. This past
summer, labor representatives on Volkswagen's board of directors
defeated management's proposal to add workers at reduced wages
because the wages were below union scale and the jobs were only
guaranteed for three years, not for life."5 The labor representatives'
action was striking because the German unemployment rate at the time
was nine percent, more than three times the U.S. rate. Germany's
system of corporate governance may affect its ability to compete in a
global market, but whether this price is acceptable is, of course, a
political decision and one that will change only gradually, if at all.
Il. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Like the German system of corporate governance, the Japanese
system, for different reasons, isolates corporate management from
market forces and direct shareholder influences. This system
potentially frees Japanese managers to be responsive to nonshareholder
constituencies. Unlike the German (and U.S.) systems, however, the
44. According to Professor Mark J. Roe:
The weakness of the supervisory board might be structurally linked to
codetermination. If so, prevailing reform proposals (e.g., limiting the number of
boards an individual can serve on) may fail to improve the board much, because
they fail to address a fundamental structural dilemma for Germany. Moreover, the
weakness of German securities markets may in important ways be due to the
weakness of the German supervisory board.
Mark J. Roe, German Codeterminat'on and German Securities Markets, 1998 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 167, 182.
45. Burt Herman, German Union, V-kswagen Agree to Hiring Proposal, LATZIEs.CoM,
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aspects of Japanese corporate governance that have these isolating
effects are informal, not legal, in nature." Indeed, the formal structure
of Japanese corporate governance bears a far greater resemblance to
the American system than it does to Germany's." In Japan, as in the
United States, shareholders alone elect the board of directors and have
ultimate legal control." The board has fiduciary duties to the
corporation enforceable (in theory) by the shareholders in derivative
actions, and, for publicly traded companies, similar disclosure
obligations apply." Of equal importance, Japan appears to have a more
robust equity market than does Germany, thus suggesting a market for
corporate control and director accountability to shareholders.' Yet,
despite these important similarities to the United States, corporate
governance in Japan is, in practice, fundamentally different from the
United States. In Japan, corporate governance is strongly influenced
by relationships: relationships between the company and its
employees who expect lifetime employment, relationships between the
company and its customers and suppliers, and, most importantly,
relationships between and among the company and its banks." These
relationships influence and, to some extent determine, board
composition and company policy. The history of corporate
governance in Japan identifies the factors that led to the current
situation.
Modem Japanese corporate governance had its start, like
Germany's, in the late-nineteenth century 3 The Japanese Commercial
Code of 1899, which established Japanese corporate law, was modeled
after German laws.' This law reflected the corporate responsibility to
shareholders and other stakeholders, including employees, and is a
view that persists today. As one Japanese scholar has observed:
47. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creaive Norm Destruction: The Evoluton of
Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2001)
(discussing the importance of norms, or nonlegal rules, in shaping Japanese corporate
governance).
48. SeeZenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutons, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 191,201(2000).
49. See Hideki Kanda, Japan, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATONS, supra note 26, at 111, 112-13.
50. Seeid. at 114-15.
51. See id.
52. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representaton and Corporate Governance: A
Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 457-58 (2001).
53. See id. at 458.
54. See Kanda, supra note 49, at 112.
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Historically, support for the corporate social responsibility argument
has been much stronger in Japan than in the United States. This trend
reflects the Germanic and Marxist economic theory that dominated
economic discussions in Japan from the turn of the century until the
1970s .... In fact, the notion that Japanese corporate responsibility
extends beyond the shareholders was so widespread in the prewar
period that virtually no one asserted the opposite view'
This scholar further noted that Marxist theories persist in the Japanese
psyche, which results in a distrust of unrestrained market capitalism."
After Japan's defeat in World War 1I, American influence on
Japanese corporate law displaced the German influence. The Japanese
Commercial Code was rewritten to adopt all the major features of the
American system." These changes were buttressed with the Japanese
Securities Act of 1948, which was modeled on the United States
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934."8
Together, these reforms created a U.S.-style shareholder-centric model,
and, in theory at least, surpassed the U.S. system." In this regard, one
Japanese scholar has observed:
Japanese corporate law values the principle of stock majority more than
its American counterpart .... Japanese shareholders have broader
voting rights than American shareholders, including rights to determine
dividends and executive compensation. Directors cannot be elected by
either preferred shareholders or by different classes of common
shareholders, for directors may be elected only by the common
shareholders as a whole.60
55. See Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility. Dangerous and Hamzfil,
Though Maybe Notrrelevan 84 CORNELLL. REv 1227, 1250 (1999).
56. Id Professor Sanford M. Jacoby opines:
In a nutshell, Japan and Germany had big governments before big business ....
... [This] meant that corporate law at an early stage limited shareholder
rights so as to promote various national interests. Those interests include a strong
military, regional development, and the establishment of rudimentary worker rights
.... Workplace representation along these lines started in Germany and Japan
around the time of World War I, with strong support from government. ...
The situation in the United States was completely different. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had the weakest national
government in the developed world: small, constrained by federalism, and with
relatively little directive power over economic development. On the other hand,
American corporations were the largest in the world....
Jacoby, supra note 52, at 463-64 (footnote omitted).
57. See Kanda, supra note 49, at 112.
58. See Milhaupt, supm note 47, at 2098; see also Kanda, supranote 49, at 112.
59. See Milhaupt, supra note 47, at 2098-99.
60. See Shishido, supra note 48, at 198 (footnote omitted).
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However, the scholar notes, "many will agree that Japanese corporate
practice is employee-oriented rather than pro-shareholder" and that
societal norms play a larger role in this difference than legal or
economic influences.6
Under Japanese law, the shareholders hold an annual meeting to
elect a board that appoints the executive officers of the company from
among its ranks.' The board supervises the officers, makes important
corporate decisions, and owes duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation, which may be enforced by the shareholders through
derivative actions. 3 These familiar structural elements are, however,
implemented in a very different fashion in Japan. The first, and
possibly most important, difference is that, by custom, long-term
employees of the corporation are the primary source of new directors.'
For instance, in 1993, "[a]ll fifty-five directors on the board of Toyota
were former employees, thirty-one of Honda's thirty-three directors
were former employees, thirty-four of Nihon Denso's thirty-five
directors were former employees, and twenty-five of Aisin Seild's
twenty-eight directors were former employees. " s
As a result of this custom, the board and senior management
likely have an employee's perspective on corporate policy, thus
providing, informally, protection for employees similar to that in
Germany under codetermination. 6 Whether this employee orientation
is, on balance, positive for Japanese companies or the Japanese
economy is beyond the scope of this Essay. Suffice it to say that there
are obvious advantages and disadvantages to a system that protects
employees. Firms invest in human capital and realize the advantages
of a stable, well-trained, and loyal workforce. On the other hand, this
same stability means that Japanese companies forego new employees
in favor of retaining permanent employees, possibly sacrificing new
talent and future leaders and disrupting normal promotion and career
progress." Also, when Japanese companies experience hardships they
often choose to sacrifice profits, dividends, or shareholder value
61. Id at 201.
62. Miwa, supm note 55, at 1231.
63. Kanda, supra note 49, at 112-13. While these aspects parallel the U.S. system,
Japanese law has an additional feature unknown under U.S. law: directors are liable to third
parties if they act in bad faith or are grossly negligent. Id at 113.
64. SeeMiwa, supra note 55, at 1238.
65. Id
66. See Milhaupt, supra note 47, at 2091.
67. Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment Labor Peace and the
Evoludon ofJapanese Corporate Goverance, 99 CoLum. L. REv. 508, 538 (1999).
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instead of employees, s possibly affecting the firm's long-term
competitiveness.
In addition to the employee orientation of the board of directors,
four other characteristics of Japanese corporate governance
differentiate the Japanese system from the American system, resulting
in a relative isolation of the Japanese board from typical shareholder
pressures. These characteristics include: the "main bank" relationship,
cross-shareholdings, the ineffectiveness of shareholder suits, and the
lack of hostile takeovers. The first characteristic, the relationship
between the corporation and its principle lenders, stems in part from
the Japanese traditional reliance on bank financing in lieu of public
debt.69 These bank-lenders also typically are shareholders of their
borrowers. Although banks are limited to a five percent equity stake in
any one company, the lending group typically owns between twenty
and twenty-five percent of a company's stock and acts in concert,"
with the largest lender of the group assuming the position of the "main
bank:' The main bank is not a legal concept, but rather describes a
relationship in which the main bank assumes some responsibility for
its borrowers in financial difficulty. The main bank typically eschews
a foreclosure in favor of a restructuring. To American sensibilities, the
terms of this restructuring are somewhat surprising:
[T]he main bank typically waives a portion of the debt in return for a
restructuring plan by the borrower. Although the main bank almost
always has a first priority security interest in the collateral of the debtor,
the bank, in effect, voluntarily subordinates its interest to that of the
other lenders ....
... [T]he entire main bank system is supported by a cluster of norms
that encourage banks to support weak firms (at least those for which a
return to solvency and profitability are possible) in return for a
nonlegally enforceable promise by the government to prevent bank
failure. Indeed, until the early 1990s, there was not a single Japanese
bank failure in the postwar period.7'
Thus, the main bank insulates the company from negative external
pressures. Banks are generally risk averse, and main banks are
said to keep their corporate partners from aggressive high-risk,
68. See Jacoby, supm note 52, at 462.
69. SeeKanda, supra note 49, at 115.
70. See Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global
Environment: The Search for the Best ofAl Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 849
(2000).
71. Milhaupt, supra note 47, at 2088-89 (footnotes omitted).
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high-reward activities such as new start-up ventures.72 In terms of
stakeholder protection, the effect of the main-bank system is
classically pro-stakeholder. Weak finms, otherwise destined for
liquidation, are saved along with the jobs of workers and the
interests of the community, suppliers, and subordinate lenders.
The stabilization and insulation by the main bank system is
enhanced by another Japanese practice: cross-shareholding. Cross-
shareholding typically involves a reciprocal understanding between
two companies to own one percent or so of each other's common
stock.73 This arrangement often exists with many companies, usually
customers or suppliers, with the result that a substantial portion of a
company's stock is illiquid. The largest of these cross-shareholding
arrangements are called keiretsu.'4 While the keiretsu may be on a
slight decline, recent data demonstrates that the shares of over fifty
percent of large Japanese corporations are held by a combination of
main-bank and cross-shareholding arrangements, with the implicit
understanding to hold the shares indefinitely.'5 Outside shareholders
thus have little influence on corporate management; members of the
keiretsu support one another, creating a stable system resistant to
dramatic change.76 This system, by necessity, quite directly protects
the interests of customers and suppliers, classic stakeholders who
rarely are formally protected. Therefore, the pressure of the stock
market, an important factor in the governance of US. companies, is
much less of a factor, if at all, in Japan.
The absence of market pressures is complimented, at least
traditionally, by a lack of shareholder suits against management. Class
action suits are unavailable for Japanese shareholders and, until 1993,
derivative suits were quite rare.7 In 1993, however, the filing fees for
derivative suits, which had been prohibitively high, were made
nominal. As a result, the number of such suits increased from less
than twenty filings nationwide between 1950 and 1990 to nearly 300
suits pending in 1999.7' Derivative suits do not, however, meet with
great success in Japan because of the deference given by courts to
72. SeeFort & Schipani, supra note 70, at 835; Jacoby, supranote 52, at 469.
73. See Shishido, supra note 48, at 210-11.
74. SeeKanda, supm note 49, at 115.
75. SeeFort & Schipani, supm note 70, at 847-49; seealsoJacoby, supianote 52, at 469.
76. See Shishido, supra note 48, at 207-08.
77. Id. at 197; see also Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from
Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STuD. 351,352 (2001).




business executives, similar to the deferential business judgment rule
in the United States."0 Nevertheless, this dramatic increase in filings
has shaken the business climate and made corporations more
cognizant of outside shareholders.8 ' A likely result of this new
sensitivity would be to make managers more shareholder-centric and
less responsive to the demands of other constituents. However, the
claims that have been brought tend to allege serious directorial
misconduct, not that the directors have unlawfully favored
nonshareholder constituencies.
8 2
Finally, one must consider the extent to which hostile takeovers
affect managerial thinking. The takeover wave in the United States in
the 1980s undoubtedly had a dramatic effect in the corporate
boardroom. Indeed, the very term "shareholder value" entered the
corporate lexicon during that period and shaped much decision
making. The Delaware Supreme Court was a major player in this
arena, articulating a legal standard that limited the board's freedom of
action, albeit marginally, when faced with a hostile tender offer.83
More importantly, the Delaware court made clear that, in responding to
a hostile offer, a board could take into account the interests of
constituents other than shareholders only when "there [are] rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders "' Whatever may be the
legal standard for directors in Japan, there has been only one
successful hostile takeover in Japan during the last fifty years, and few
attempts."5 While the presence of main-bank and corporate cross-
shareholding could, theoretically, facilitate a hostile takeover, because
control is concentrated in a relatively few hands, in fact, this has not
been the case. These relationships foster a loyalty among the
80. Id at 353 ("Japanese shareholders rarely win, and, unlike their counterparts in the
United States, they only occasionally obtain settlement."); see also Kenji Utsumi, The
Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits in Japan: A Comparison nith
Those in the United States, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 129, 129-30 (2001).
81. SeeNest, supr note 77, at 353.
82. See id. at 362. Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt explains:
Until [the Dawa Bankcase] in the fall of 2000, the only cases in which directors of
public companies had ever been found liable to their shareholders for breach of the
duty of care involved unambiguous violations of domestic law, such as violations
of the Commercial Code. The Daiwa Bankcase itself, which involves a Caremark-
like failure-to-monitor claim, represents egregious directorial nonfeasance....
Milhaupt, supra note 47, at 2115 (footnote omitted).
83. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Unocal Revisited No Tigerin the Tank, 27 J. Corn. L.
1(2001).
84. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986).
85. See Jacoby, supa note 52, at 470; Milhaupt, supra note 47, at 2089.
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participants that is antithetical to a hostile takeover." Thus, another
obstacle to the consideration of other constituents in Japan is lacking.
The insulation of Japanese corporate management from
shareholder influences and the strong role of employees in the
corporate boardroom has given rise to a culture of lifetime
employment, stable relations with suppliers and customers, and a
concern for nonshareholder stakeholders. However, global
competition and technological changes are testing the resolve of the
Japanese system and changes may be in the offing. Recent events,
including formerly unheard of layoffs at large Japanese companies
such as NTT (20,000 employees), Nissan (21,000 employees), and
Sony (17,000 employees), may be a harbinger of things to comeY The
traditional risk aversion of Japanese companies may change as well, as
economic pressures, including an economy suffering its third recession
in ten years, motivate Japanese policymakers to seek solutions." It
remains to be seen whether Japan will revert to an Anglo-American
shareholder-centric model, or continue on its independent path.
IV CONCLUSION
The Japanese and German systems of corporate governance
share certain characteristics absent from the Anglo-American systems:
significant involvement of labor in corporate decision making; cross-
shareholding with suppliers and customers; bank influence (direct in
Germany and indirect in Japan); an absence of hostile takeovers; and
limited shareholder litigation. The aggregate affect of these factors in
both countries is to isolate the board of directors from the kind of
pressures the typical U.S. director receives from outside shareholders.
In theory, the combination of employee influence and director isolation
in Germany and Japan should facilitate the ability of directors in those
countries to respond to the concerns of other stakeholders. Whether
this is indeed the case is difficult to determine, and empirical work in
this area is nonexistent. However, as a theoretical matter, it would
appear that German and Japanese companies would be sensitive and
responsive to the concerns of nonshareholder stakeholders. This
would explain why one sees so little discussion in those countries on
this issue and why it remains a topic of discussion in the United States.
86. Milhaupt, supra note 47, at 2090.
87. Seeid at2118.
88. In the United States, forty percent of the companies listed on the stock exchange
are less than ten years old while in Japan this figure is less than one percent. See Fort &
Schipani, supra note 70, at 834.
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